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Every artwork leads to a unique experience by the observer or participant, may it be
sensory, emotional, cognitive, interactive, or spiritual experience. At the neurobiological
level, such experiences are manifested as activation of the corresponding neural networks.
Neuroscience has demonstrated that experience, in particular repeated experience, can
cause a long-term change in the involved brain circuits (experience-dependent plasticity ).
This review will discuss the molding and transformative aspect of arts, examining how
repeated and on-going experience of arts may alter cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
patterns as well as their underlying neural circuits. The application of this approach
to cognitive training and neuropsychological rehabilitation methods will be addressed
as well. In addition, it will be suggested that this approach to art, as a long-term
transformative medium, may lead to a novel viewpoint on art and a different approach
to its creation. Artists can design artworks that aspire to form, in addition to one-shot
influencing experience, on-going experiences which gradually create a lasting change,
possibly improving audiences’ neuropsychological functions.
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ART AS A NEUROCOGNITIVE EXPERIENCE
Art is a medium of inducing experiences. Artistic experiences
can be a vehicle to convey meanings, a way to provide plea-
sure, or means for self-expression and communication. Every
artwork leads to a mental experience by the observer, participant,
or experiencer. Experiencing an art work commonly involves
perceptual processes—for example, plastic arts engage low-level
visual processes such as orientation and edge detection, as well
as higher-level processes, such as object recognition and its seg-
regation from background. Similarly to daily life experiences,
an artistic experience would involve additional cognitive pro-
cesses such as executive functions, memory, emotion, and other
high-level cognitive processes. The engagement of executive func-
tions such as working memory and attention, are at the grounds
of many artistic experiences as being able to assemble the dif-
ferent pieces of the presented work and being able to avoid
distractions to be captivated by the artwork, are an essential for
experiencing it (Dudai, 2008). Intrinsic processes such as autobi-
ographic memory, emotion, and theory of mind may be driven
by perceptual elements and provide meaning and essence to the
artwork.
The specific combination of cognitive functions engaged by
an art piece depends on the art form, the particular piece and
the observer’s unique experience. For example, classical art forms
such as plastic arts, music, and film, relay mainly on perception to
drive an artistic mental experience. On the other hand, interactive
arts such as interactive installations or video games involve also
motor functions and behavioral control as part of the induced
experience. Importantly, people performing or practicing arts
such as musicians or actors, also engage such action-related
mechanisms while they practice their arts.
THE EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE ON THE BRAIN
EXPERIENCE AS NEURAL NETWORK ACTIVITY
At the neurobiological level, mental experiences are manifested
as activation of the corresponding neural networks at the visual
and auditory cortices, attention and memory networks, emo-
tional brain regions, frontal and other brain regions, and their
combinations. The distribution of the neuronal activity patterns
depends on the particular cognitive processes that form and drive
the experience (Kandel et al., 2000). Whether experience can be
captured merely by biological correlates, or there are compo-
nents which can not be described in physical terms and are only
introspectively accessible (e.g., the sensation of seeing red; termed
Qualia; Koch, 2004), has been intensively debated in philosophy.
Here I will focus on the aspects of experience that are mani-
fested and can be measured on a neurobiological or behavioral
level.
EXPERIENCE-INDUCED BRAIN PLASTICITY
A key characteristic of the brain is its capacity to change as a
result of experience (see reviews in Buonomano and Merzenich,
1998; Kolb and Whishaw, 1998; Kandel, 2001; Pascual-Leone
et al., 2005). Neural learning theories are commonly based
on the notion termed experience-dependent plasticity which
states that activation of a neural network leads to a modifica-
tion of the corresponding synaptic connections (Hebb, 1949).
Multiple human and animal neuroscience studies have demon-
strated that experiences can lead to brain changes ranging
from cellular modifications to formation of new synaptic con-
nections and reorganization of cortical networks (reviews in
Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998; Kolb and Whishaw, 1998;
Kandel, 2001; Kelly and Garavan, 2005; Pascual-Leone et al.,
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2005). In particular, studies suggest experience-based neural plas-
ticity processes underlie the change and adaptation of visual
perception capabilities (Kourtzi and DiCarlo, 2006; Sagi, 2010).
Various experimental procedures were designed to induce long-
term changes of perception, for example improvement of low-
level perceptual abilities (e.g., Karni and Sagi, 1991; Recanzone
et al., 1993; reviews Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998; Sagi,
2010), as well as higher perceptual abilities such as learning
to recognize objects (Kourtzi and DiCarlo, 2006), and gradu-
ally transforming perceptual object recognition (Preminger et al.,
2007, 2009b). Similar experience-dependent plasticity character-
istics have been demonstrated in the motor domain (e.g., Newell
and Rosenbloom, 1981; Karni et al., 1998; Bezzola et al., 2011) as
well as higher-order cognitive functions such as working memory
(Mahncke et al., 2006; Chein and Morrison, 2010). Many studies
have also demonstrated that behavioral changes that are induced
by repetitive training are accompanied by long-term changes in
brain activity and structure (e.g., Karni et al., 1998; Li et al., 2009;
Bezzola et al., 2011; review in Kelly and Garavan, 2005). The
experience-based plasticity approach has been also applied suc-
cessfully to induce neural changes and functional improvement
in cognitive functions for people with various cognitive impair-
ments. For example, training has been shown to improve visual
perception in amblyopia (Polat et al., 2004), and motor function
in stroke (Hlustík and Mayer, 2006).
Importantly, studies of perceptual and motor experienced-
based plasticity have shown specific conditions and constraints
for perceptual andmotor learning. These principles could serve as
guidelines and stating point when considering more broad plas-
ticity principles. Major factors include: time-scales of learning,
specificity vs. difficulty, interference, order of learning, training
intensity and duration, context, motivation, and arousal, feed-
back, and variability. A full description of these principles is
out of the scope of this review, the details can be found in
(Green and Bavelier, 2008; Sagi, 2010; Preminger, 2011). In addi-
tion, other insights from learning research may be applied. One
important example is the role of deliberate practice in develop-
ing expertise—it has been suggested that the amount of deliberate
practice is a major factor influencing the level of expertise in
various domains (Ericsson et al., 1993).
It is important to note that the focus of this review is on
mechanisms of change of cognitive function which are based on
repeated or ongoing experiences which gradually modify synap-
tic connections and consequently cognitive processing. This is
a major mechanism by which many of our cognitive functions
adjust and improve over time. Other mechanisms for induc-
ing long-term changes exist, such as one-shot learning, which
is often seen in episodic memory (Roediger et al., 2007), where
one-time experiences may be remembered, and may induce
long-term neural changes (Ludmer et al., 2011). When consid-
ering a lasting effect of their work most artists probably have
in mind such long-term effect due to single impression. Here I
put forward a different approach, proposing that art could be
viewed as a medium that by instigating repeated experiences
may induce long-term changes and serve as means for mod-
ification, improvement, and rehabilitation of various cognitive
functions.
THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE ON
THE BRAIN
There are many examples of potentially transformative aspects
of experiencing art, such ongoing exposure to plastic art and
music influencing our perception and sense of beauty, or watch-
ing films or television affecting our social and behavioral patterns.
Although multiple studies explore brain activation while expe-
riencing various art mediums: plastic arts (Zeki, 1999; Ishai,
2011), music (Stewart, 2008), and films (Hasson et al., 2008,
2009), research of the long-term effect of repeated and ongo-
ing exposure to artistic experiences is limited. Only a few studies
examine the lasting effect of perceiving art on the brain, as it is
not easy to isolate the effect of such ongoing experiences and
to follow them long-term. One recent example is a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study conducted on a short
training in recognizing objects in cubist paintings (Wiesmann
and Ishai, 2010), which has demonstrated that trained sub-
jects where better than non-trained ones at the trained task
and showed enhanced brain activity in the parahippocampal
cortex.
Studies of the long-term effects of art often focus on the
effects of practicing art—some by comparing artists to non-
artists, and others by examining effects on purposely trained
subjects. Specifically, the effect of practicing music on brain and
cognition has been studied considerably, demonstrating struc-
tural and functional specializations (Stewart, 2008; Jancke, 2009).
For example, a brain imaging study comparing brains of musi-
cians and non-musicians demonstrated that musicians havemore
gray matter in primary auditory cortex (Schneider et al., 2005).
Another study, which compared electroencephalography (EEG)
event-related potentials during presentation of auditory stimuli
between children with musical training and ones without, has
demonstrated that musical training enhances the sensitivity of the
auditory system (Meyer et al., 2011).
The practice of visual arts has also been examined. For exam-
ple, a recent EEG study (Kottlow et al., 2011) found decreased
upper alpha waves in artists vs. non-artists during various draw-
ing tasks, suggesting that cognitive functioning, semantic mem-
ory, and object recognition are enhanced in artists. Another study,
comparing eye-movements of visual artists to non-artists, showed
that while viewing pictures artists spend more time scanning
structural and abstract features, whereas non-artists focus more
on human features and objects (Vogt and Magnussen, 2007).
Importantly, some of these studies point to the fact that prac-
ticing art may influence not only perception but also higher-order
cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and executive
functions. Of particular potential for such effects on high-level
cognitive functions are also art domains which are centered on
action by the artist, such as performing arts, or by the experiencer,
such as interactive arts (e.g., interactive installations and the-
ater, video games). In the following, I elaborate on the long-term
effects of two such examples—video games and improvisation in
theater and music.
VIDEO GAMES
Video games are one domain in which the long-term effect
on brain and cognition was studied more extensively. This is
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probably due to the fact that video games are designed for repet-
itive experience and are used as such. Although the inclusion of
video games as part of arts is debated (Jenkins, 2000; Kroll, 2000),
contemporary approaches appreciate the artistic quality of video
games and their strong influence on modern culture (Smuts,
2005). In the context of our discussion, since video games clearly
induce experience, are rewarding and engaging, and often com-
municate meaning, we view them as artistic experience. Studies
of the long-term effects of playing video games have demon-
strated that action games improve performance in many sensory,
perceptual, and attentional tasks that extend well beyond the
trained conditions (Green and Bavelier, 2006a). Playing action
video games was shown to improve visual reaction times (review
in Dye et al., 2009), enhance visuomotor coordination (e.g.,
Drew and Waters, 1986), improve spatial visualization skills (e.g.,
Dorval and Pepin, 1986), enhance various aspects of attention,
(Green and Bavelier, 2003, 2006b; Feng et al., 2007), and improve
probabilistic inference (Green et al., 2010). These effects were
demonstrated by comparing gamers to non-games or by study-
ing training effects on a purposely trained group vs. a control
group. Recently it was demonstrated that at least some cogni-
tive differences between gamers and non-gamers result either
from pre-existing group differences or from very extensive game
experience (Boot et al., 2008), thus studying gamers to infer the
neurocognitive effects of games should be done with caution.
Altogether, video game playing has been shown to result in
a broad spectrum of generalized performance enhancements in
perceptual abilities as well as high-level cognitive functions. It
has been suggested that probabilistic inference may be a general
learning mechanism underlying these wide-range improvements
(Green et al., 2010). However, these cognitive enhancements
could also be attributed to several other factors. First, video games
involve a more holistic and variable experience than classical
perceptual learning paradigms (Green and Bavelier, 2008; Sagi,
2010) and thus are more ecological. Second, experiencing video
games involves behaving and acting in an intensive and dynamic
environment which may lead to enhanced learning (Achtman
et al., 2008). Finally, rewards in video games are very domi-
nant and timely assigned, which could be another reason for
improved learning (Achtman et al., 2008). These characteristics of
video games are also in contrast to art domains where experience
involves mainly perception, which incites thoughts and emotions
but does not involve action, and often is less intense. The value
of these various characteristics and the principles underlying the
generalization power of different training and practice formats
will be further discussed later.
IMPROVISATION IN THEATER AND MUSIC
To improvise means to grasp the present circumstances and act
accordingly and appropriately, not being constrained by habits,
fears, or conformity, nor behaving randomly or by impulses
(Nachmanovitch, 1990). Performance of such “non-default”
behavior in complex and novel contexts characterizes the func-
tions of the frontal lobes (Mesulam, 2002). Although we all
improvise in our daily life when we act in complex or novel situ-
ations, improvisation is also strongly associated with improvised
performance in the arts, specifically in music and theater.
Recently several neuroimaging studies have examined brain
activation during musical improvisation and demonstrated acti-
vation of prefrontal regions (Bengtsson et al., 2007; Limb and
Braun, 2008; Berkowitz and Ansari, 2008). Furthermore, it has
been noted that many of the exercises and practices performed
by improvisation actors share high resemblance to classical neu-
ropsychological assessments for prefrontal functions (Preminger,
2009a, 2011). Consequently it was suggested that improvisation
training can serve as training and rehabilitation for prefrontal
functions (Preminger, 2009a, 2011), proposing that a major ben-
efit of such training is its resemblance to real-life, leading to a
higher potential for transfer. Brain activity during some specific
improvisation tasks and the long-term effect of their continued
practice has been examined and demonstrated using fMRI and
computerized paradigms that simulate improvisation exercises to
allow for scientific investigation (Preminger et al., 2008, 2010a;
Loya et al., 2010).
So far I focused on describing how a given art experience
affects the brain. Given that brain and cognition have the capac-
ity to be molded by artistic experiences, art can be created in
a way that takes this knowledge into account and utilizes it to
generate transformative experiences with particular artistic or
rehabilitational goals in mind.
ART AS ENGINEERED EXPERIENCE
Although the nature of aesthetic experience has been forcefully
debated for centuries, there is a general agreement in the west-
ern culture about the term aesthetic experience, and various
suggestion for its components where proposed. For example,
Ramachandran and Hirstein proposed the Eight laws of artistic
experience—common principles for how visual artistic experi-
ences excite human cognition and brain (e.g., grouping, sym-
metry, and peak shift principles; Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1999). Furthermore, many art theorists agree that overall there
are many commonalities in the way different people (from same
culture) experience a given artwork. Some even claim that the
ability to convey a consistent experience is a criterion for the
quality of the artwork. Indeed, previous studies have demon-
strated that eye-movement of different viewers while viewing the
same famous paintings share a lot in common (Yarbuz, 1976).
Similar results where recently obtained with viewers of commer-
cial movies (Hasson et al., 2004, 2008). Furthermore, neurosci-
entists have suggested that at least at an elementary level, what
happens in different brains when viewing works of art is very
similar (Zeki, 1998). Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
a common brain activity pattern when subjects viewed paint-
ings (Ishai, 2011), or when subjects listened to musical pieces
(Stewart, 2008). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that when
viewing a movie the time course of brain activity in sensory
and association cortices correlated across viewers (Hasson et al.,
2004). Nevertheless, correlation across viewers was not seen in all
regions, in particular not in frontal cortical regions. The subjec-
tive aspect of perception was also demonstrated by a recent study
of conscious perception using Dali’s ambiguous painting (Smith
et al., 2006) which demonstrated that different image compo-
nents drive different observers to reach the same perceptual
awareness.
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Clearly, the ability to control the cognitive processes depends
on the art medium (e.g., plastic art vs. cinema vs. music).
Furthermore, the inclination of artists to induce a common
experience across all viewers varies. One clear example is the
different approaches taken by various film directors and theo-
rists: whereas the Russian montage editing approach promoted
“engineering” newmovie experiences by combining different per-
ceptual components together, the other side of the spectrum
can be represented by André Bazin who advocated films which
are “objective reality,” leaving the viewer free to have his own
subjective experience. Along these lines, it has been recently
demonstrated that different films by different directors vary in
the consistency of brain activation across viewers, where struc-
tured movies such as Bang! You’re Dead by Hitchcock, elicited a
wide range of brain regions where activity was correlated across
subjects who viewed the movie (Hasson et al., 2008). On the
other hand, an un-structured movie of a daily-life scene very few
regions demonstrated correlation across subjects (Hasson et al.,
2008).
In summary, at least to some extent, artists can be viewed as
experts in controlling and manipulating humans’ perceptions as
well as the emotional and cognitive experience that they induce.
ENGINEERING ARTISTIC EXPERIENCES FOR LONG-TERM
CHANGE
This capacity of the artist to engineer experiences, and thus brain
activity, can be, and has been, taken one step further. Art can
be used to induce long-term changes in cognition, emotion, and
behavior. One example for a similar approach was applied in
the past, again by Soviet film directors (Dziga Vertov, Sergei
Eisenstein), who promoted the usage of cinema as a propaganda
tool for emotional and psychological influence on their audience
for ideological purposes. Likewise, advertizing and marketing
experts have been using similar principles over and over to achieve
their commercial goals by changing behavioral, emotional and
thought patterns (termed NeuroMarketing; e.g., Rothschild et al.,
1986; Rothschild and Hyun, 1990; McClure et al., 2004).
These approaches are aligned with the theory of experience-
based plasticity by their similar reliance on repeated experi-
ence for modifying cognition. However, in contrast to these
approaches who put in front of their eyes a goal which is external
to the goals of their experiencer (e.g., buy some product, sup-
port a political movement), the approach presented here places
focus on the consideration of art as a method for influencing and
optimization of cognitive and brain functions to the benefit and
value of the observer or experiencer, similarly to the approach
taken by rehabilitation disciplines in designing cognitive training
programs.
THE VALUE OF ART AS A TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE
To understand how artistic experiences may contribute in design-
ing transformative experiences, the first question that comes to
mind is what is unique about artistic experience as opposed
to other experiences such as daily-life experience or classical
cognitive training experiences. The uniqueness of artistic and aes-
thetic experience is a broad and complex topic which has been
addressed extensively by artists and philosophers. I will focus here
mainly on the aspects that might be relevant to the transforma-
tive aspect of art. What qualities of artistic experience may cause
it to be a better transformative experience than a daily life expe-
rience? What value can if offer over classical cognitive training
paradigms?
Some theorists describe aesthetic experience with emphasis
on unity, holism, and emotional experience. “In aesthetic expe-
rience . . . there is completeness and unity and necessarily emotion.”
(Dewey, 1934). Likewise it was suggested (Beardsley, 1958) that
all aesthetic experiences have in common the following fea-
tures: “focus, intensity, and unity, where unity is a matter of
coherence and of completeness.” This view, which stresses the
immersive and holistic nature of the experience of art, points
to the advantage of art as a training tool due to its captivating
and engaging nature which presumably leads to focus, atten-
tion, and motivation which are know to enhance learning (Green
and Bavelier, 2008). A neurocognitive model was recently sug-
gested to explain the immersive nature of art, particularly films,
which proposed that under proper context and mind set, the
viewer’s central executive hands-over control to the film infor-
mation, resulting in a temporary rewarding dissociative state.
(Dudai, 2008). This model emphasizes the potential of some
forms of art to detach their audience from the surrounding world.
It is important to note that the information that forms such
a holistic and immersive experience does not have to originate
solely from the artwork, some information may also be comple-
mented from intrinsic, self-related processes, as will be discussed
below.
The distinctiveness of artistic experience was also extensively
addresses by Zeki (Zeki, 1998), elaborating on views of various
artists and theorists who emphasized the “gist” aspect of art:
“art shows us that there are also constant truths concerning forms”
(Mondrian). “Artist . . . give(s) reality a more lasting interpretation”
(Matisse). “The whole beauty and grandeur of Art consists . . . in
being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, particular-
ities of every kind . . .makes out an abstract idea of their forms . . . ”
(John constable) (quotes from Zeki, 1998). Along the same lines,
Zeki presents the views of Hegel and Kant who deem art as being
able to represent reality better than “ephemera of sense data,”
proposing that the brain, which has representation of concepts,
can, when viewing art, easily extract them in a simpler manner
than when viewing real-world perceptions. “Art furnished us with
the things themselves, but out of the inner life of the mind” (Hegel,
quote from Zeki, 1998). This point of view suggests two potential
values for training: one concerning art as an abstract and general-
ized representation, and the other concerning the necessity the art
induces to complete the experience from “the inner mind” thus
using imagery and internal mentation.
The first aspect, regarding art as abstract and generalized rep-
resentation, proposes that art extracts and presents the essence of
things. Zeki further suggested that art and the brain share this
capacity (Zeki, 1998), both seeking to find constancies in the
world, and to represent the essence of objects and events given
the dynamic and variable world around. This proposed char-
acteristic of art again may imply that art can be a vehicle for
improvement of representation, and allow more efficient access
and modification of brain representations. This may suggest
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that learning through artistic experience can be more effective
and more prone to generalization. Interestingly, this notion of a
generalized representation, which is invariant of specific details
and exemplars, resembles ideas behind the prevailing neural net-
work models of associative memory (Hertz et al., 1991; Amit,
1995). In these models, memories are represented as stable states
of network activity, called attractors, each attractor being the
memory representation of all input stimuli that are drawn to it
through network dynamics. Attractors are typically formed by
Hebbian learning of overlapping patterns of synaptic efficacies
(Hebb, 1949; Hertz et al., 1991; Amit, 1995), and thus the learned
memory representations are formed by the specific history of
experiences (Blumenfeld et al., 2006).
The second aspect, the necessity to complete the experience
from “the inner mind,” addresses another possible advantage—
the self-driven activation of some brain representations as
opposed to pure externally driven activation. Indeed, artworks
require the experiencer to “complete the experience” using imag-
ination and other internally generated cognitive processes to fill
in the gap to create a holistic experience. Imagery is known to be
a useful tool for cognitive training in physiotherapy. For exam-
ple, it was demonstrated that training for stroke patients which
included motor imagery in addition to occupational therapy was
more effective than training with occupational therapy alone
(Page et al., 2001). In addition, filling-in the gap by “inserting”
the viewers own subjective self experience, is possibly what allows
for enhanced immersion and identification. Self-related thought
processes, such introspection, self-representation, autobiographic
and prospective memory, and volition, are suggested be mediated
by a network of brain regions called the default-mode network
(Gusnard andRaichle, 2001; Buckner et al., 2008; Preminger et al.,
2010b). Such self-driven processes, combined with the externally
driven ones are possibly what make the experience comprehen-
sive. Clearly, different forms of art vary in the gap they leave
between the provided and self-generated information. This can be
considered and used depending on the goals of the transformative
artwork.
Another interesting aspect can be derived from theory of
performing arts (Schechner, 2002). It is suggested that the per-
forming art entail an aspect of “re-doing” on top of to the “doing”
itself. Re-doing means that any activity is a restored behavior,
thus the activity comes in context of previous instances, and these
restored behaviors can be “worked on . . . played with, made into
something else . . . [even] transformed” (Schechner, 2002). More
broadly, the artist can be thought of as “re-doing” a real-life
experience of the experiencer. He drives the experiencer to re-
experience some “basic” stored experience, but in a manipulated
way. Thus, the artist can choose to emphasize a specific aspect of
the experience, decide how emotional the experience will be, to
what context it will be put in, etc.
As opposed to scientists, who are specialists in breaking down
the cognitive experience into pieces, artists specialize in activa-
tion of multiple cognitive functions in cohort, generating holistic
experiences involving perception, executive functions, intrinsic
processes, and sometimes even action. Whereas researchers of
visual perception commonly study simple and isolated stimuli
to study the visual cortex (Sagi, 2010), painters, film makers,
and video game designers are experts in inducing experiences
by complex visual stimuli, thus causing a wide spread brain
activation, where different brain networks work in cohort (in
cinema, Hasson et al., 2004). Thus, possibly, the experience of
art, can be placed somewhere in between scientific paradigms
and real-life experience. It is “engineered” and has the essence
of the experience but on the other hand it is also holistic and
comprehensive.
ART AS LONG-TERM TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE
Currently many artworks are seen by observers on a single-
exposure basis, in a museum, gallery, or theater, and are created
as such. However, some artworks do get repetitive exposure by
their audiences, intentionally or un-intentionally. A good exam-
ple is art which is presented in the public space (e.g., artworks by
Christo, Anish Kapoor) where people have the chance to expe-
rience it again and again when passing by. Another example is
recorded music, where a particular piece of music may be heard
again and again. Similarly a painting which is hanged in the cor-
ridor of an office building, or in a living room, is experienced
repetitively every day. How does the experience change from
exposure to exposure? Does it leave any accumulating long-term
mark on observers’ cognition and brain? Would the artworks
be designed differently if the repetitive exposure effect would
have been taken into account? For instance, when seeing the
same painting in your office corridor day by day, you probably
already ignore it. What if it would have been a video-art that
slightly changes every day? Will you notice? What effect could
it have on you? These questions are for artists and researchers
to answer.
Neuroscience methods offer a good starting point for devel-
oping systematic measures of the impact of long-term exposure
to art on specific cognitive capabilities of the viewer, and to
the unique contribution of the artistic aspects to these effects.
Specifically, studies of experience-based plasticity utilize vari-
ous cognitive tasks and neuropsychological assessments (Lezak,
1995) to evaluate changes in various cognitive functions (e.g.,
Mahncke et al., 2006; Chein andMorrison, 2010; Preminger et al.,
2010a). Similar tools can be used to study the effect of long-
term repeated artistic experience, as done in (Green and Bavelier,
2006b; Green et al., 2010). Assessing the unique effect of artis-
tic experiences as opposed other experiences is more complex
and touches upon philosophical questions regarding the defi-
nition of artistic experience, which is out of the scope of this
review. Ignoring these philosophical aspects, and assuming com-
monly accepted views of art, some recent approaches taken in
neuroesthetics literature present attempts of comparing artistic
experience to non-artistic experience in studies examining brain
activation by art. One approach is by comparing artistic stim-
uli to similar natural stimuli (e.g., Dio et al., 2011, comparing
photos of sculptures of human body with photos of real bod-
ies, or comparing paintings to scrambled paintings in Wiesmann
and Ishai, 2010). Another approach compares different genres of
art (e.g., comparing representational and indeterminate paint-
ings in Ishai et al., 2007). Similar comparisons can be used to
study the unique effects of long-term exposure to art, for example
comparing people who walk to their work through a park with
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sculptures/art with people walking to their work via the same or
a similar part without sculptures, or comparing effects playing
different genres of video games or hearing types of music. Such
approaches may provide insights to what are the effective com-
ponents in different art forms and genres. Another approach that
can be used is the comparison between artists to non-artists as
described above.
Utilizing continuing experience to induce long-term change of
neuropsychological functions may lead to a novel viewpoint on
art and a different approach to its creation. Artists can design
artworks that aspire to form, in addition to a one-shot influ-
ence on experience and affect, continuing experiences which
accumulate into to a lasting change on specific neurocognitive
functions. Similarly to the questions an artist asks today: what
meaning or experience do I want to convey to my audience? How
will I convey it? Artists could consider the questions: what last-
ing change do I want to induce by on-going exposure and on
which neurocognitive functions? How can I induce it? Principles
of experience-based plasticity discovered within the perceptual,
motor, emotional, and executive domains, together with the expe-
rience and knowledge acquired in the arts, could form the foun-
dation for this new approach to art as a continuing transformative
experience.
CONCLUSIONS
This review links between the research of experience-based plas-
ticity and the on-going and repeated experience of art in its
various forms. The integration of knowledge from these differ-
ent fields offers a potential for both disciplines. Scientists who
study plasticity and develop paradigms to induce long-term neu-
rocognitive changes may benefit from the various advantages of
the holism, engagement, and the “gist” that art experiences offer.
On the other hand, artists may use the experience-based plasticity
approach to extend their aesthetic creations from immediate one-
shot experiences to on-going or repeated experiences that induce
long-lasting neurocognitive effect.
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